Merchandise trade between India and China has accelerated rapidly in recent years. China is now India's largest trading partner while India is also one of China's major trade partners. The rise in trade reflects an enhanced economic engagement between the two countries. A notable aspect of the growing trade, however, is its increasing imbalance. The balance of trade is not only in China's favour, but also exhibiting an increasing trend over time.
and mineral fuels and oil) are prominent exports. Ores comprise more than half of India's exports to China, with such exports heavily dominated by iron ore followed by chromium and lead ore.
India's major exports to China are not the same as its main exports to the rest of the world. If Indian exports are categorised in terms of their value-based significance from a global perspective, then the Chinese market, till now, remains a less important destination for the most significant exports like gems and petroleum, though it is a major market for several 'second-most' significant exports.
In sharp contrast to India-China trade, the trade balance between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is in favour of the latter. Major ASEAN exports to China are broadly dominated by capital-intensive products such as machineries and appliances followed by resource-intensive items like minerals, plastic and rubber. A comparison between India's main exports to China and those by ASEAN reveals several commonalities. The common categories include ores, slag and ash, organic chemicals, machinery and mechanical appliances, plastic, copper, mineral fuels and electrical equipment.
Empirical analysis of relative competitiveness shows India to be more competitive in the Chinese market vis-à-vis major Southeast Asian countries in some select product categories. These include vegetable products (lac), food preparations (residues from food), chemical and allied products (inorganic, tanning extracts, explosives), hides and skins (raw hides, skins and leather) and textiles (man-made filaments and made-up textile articles). India's current basket of leading exports to China hardly reflects this relative competitiveness. Other than inorganic chemicals, none of India's competitive product groups (vis-à-vis ASEAN) figure among its major exports to China.
China's trade deficits with most major ASEAN economies, coupled with a high incidence of machinery and equipment in ASEAN exports to China, indicate China's reliance on ASEAN as an efficient source of intermediate and semi-processed machinery imports. These imports have enabled several segments of Chinese manufacturing to climb to relatively higher ends of value chains. In this sense, ASEAN exports have facilitated China's manufacturing progress, while India's have not. This explains why Indian exports to China have not been rising as fast as those from Southeast Asia.
Introduction
Bilateral merchandise trade between China and India has accelerated rapidly in recent years. China has displaced the United States of America to emerge as India's largest trading partner. At the same time, India is also figuring among the top 10 major trade partners of China. The sharp increase in trade reflects enhanced economic engagement between the two countries that is expected to increase further as both recover from their current phases of economic downturns.
China is India's largest source of merchandise imports and accounted for more than a tenth of India's total imports in the year 2008-09. 2 The bilateral merchandise trade balance is not only in favour of China, but also exhibiting an increasing trend over time. This is in spite of China emerging as the third largest market for Indian exports and accounting for more than five percent of India's total exports. 3 The bilateral services trade balance, however, is expected to be in India's favour although the lack of data on services trade constrains a deeper analysis in this regard.
The increasing imbalance in goods trade between China and India draws attention to the determinants of such imbalance. A key factor in this respect is the relative competitiveness of Indian exports in the Chinese market vis-à-vis similar exports into China from other countries. A country's export competitiveness reflects its comparative advantages in different sectors. These advantages indicate efficiencies of the country in manufacturing different export items. Efficiencies depend on a variety of factors including resource endowments, technological capabilities and human skills.
Trade between two countries, according to neo-classical arguments, is expected to occur in line with their respective comparative advantages. However, in a world where trade takes place in a thickly-knitted web of multiple partners, relative comparative advantages make major differences to accesses obtained by exports from a particular country in other markets.
Viewed from this perspective, Indian exports to China may well reflect India's comparative advantage in manufacturing the exported items vis-à-vis China. However, is India necessarily more competitive in manufacturing these items than other countries that are manufacturing and exporting the same items to China as well? For example, are Indian exports to China more competitive than similar exports from Southeast Asia to China?
The question assumes vital importance given that the global financial downturn and consequent contractions in export demand in American and European markets encourage both China and India to view each other as major export markets. But will further expansion in bilateral trade accentuate the imbalance against India? It will, if Chinese exports to India continue to grow at faster rates than Indian exports to China. But if Indian exports gain greater market access in China in future, then bilateral trade may expand in a more balanced manner.
This paper examines the relative competitiveness of Indian exports in the Chinese market as a key determinant in influencing the growing imbalance in bilateral trade. The competitiveness of Indian exports is empirically assessed against those from the Southeast Asian countries with the latter assumed as major competitors of Indian exports on account of similarities in export baskets and factor endowments. The paper deliberates on the future prospects of Indian exports in the Chinese market and explores the potential of a bilateral trade pact in this regard.
China's Trade with India and Southeast Asia
China is a relatively late entrant into the multilateral trade family. It joined the WTO in December 2001, seven years after the WTO got going. Indo-China bilateral trade was US$2.3 billion at the time of China's accession to the WTO, which was merely 5.7 percent of the current trade of US$40.6 billion. The years that followed witnessed a remarkable increase in bilateral trade. The increase was a reflection of the robust growth in overall external trade experienced by both countries. Indeed, external merchandise trades of both countries in recent years show much higher rates of growth than those in world trade. Though Chinese and Indian trades have grown at almost identical rates, China has been contributing relatively more to world trade. An effective export-oriented growth strategy has enhanced China's share in global merchandise trade from 4.7 percent in 2002 to 7.9 percent in 2008. During the same period, India's share in world merchandise trade has increased from 0.8 percent to 1.4 percent. China has been contributing to world trade in a far more significant manner primarily on account of its ability to push a diverse variety of low-cost manufacturing exports. In 2002, right after entering the WTO, Chinese merchandise exports (US$325.6 billion) were 5.0 percent of world exports (US$6.5 trillion). Over the next seven years, China has raised its share to 8.9 percent of world exports (US$1.4 trillion out of total world exports of US$16.1 trillion). In contrast, India's merchandise exports have increased from US$49.3 billion in 2002 to US$179 billion in 2008, which has resulted in India's share in world exports increasing from 0.8 percent to 1.1 percent during this period. 4 As a stylised fact, India's merchandise trade imbalance with China should not be considered an exception since China's trade balance with the rest of the world itself shows an accentuating imbalance. China's overall trade surplus increased from US$30. 4 6 At present, the overall merchandise trade-GDP ratio is more than 40 percent. Much of the increase -from a corresponding ratio of 24.4 percent in 2003-04 -has been achieved from an expansion in imports rather than exports. A sharp increase in imports from China has contributed significantly in this regard.
Data provided by the Indian source agencies (viz. the Ministry of Commerce and the Reserve Bank of India) point to broadly similar conclusions on Indo-China trade as those derived from the WTO statistics. India's trade with China has risen at a faster rate than its trade with the rest of the world (Table 1) . This is visible for all years beginning from 2003-04, except for 2008-09, which can be considered an unusual year on account of the outbreak of the financial crisis. Indeed, from a Chinese perspective as well, its trade with India has risen at a faster rate than its trade with the rest of the world. Indian imports have been the main driver behind the robust increase in Indo-China trade. China is now India's biggest source of imports accounting for 10.7 percent of its total imports. Since 2005-06, India's imports from China have been increasing at a faster rate than its corresponding exports to China (Table 1) . Since 2005-06, while the rate of growth of Indian exports to China has been broadly similar to the rate of growth in its exports to the rest of the world, growth in imports from China has consistently exceeded the growth in its overall imports (Table 1 ).
India's main exports to China are dominated by resource-based and labour-intensive products (Table 2) . Mineral products (for example, ores, slag and ash, salt and sulphur and mineral fuels and oil) are prominent exports. Ores, slag and ash comprise more than half of Indian exports to China with such exports heavily dominated by iron ore, followed by chromium and lead ores. 7 China is the largest consumer of iron ore produced in India with iron ore exports to China in 2008-09 (April-December) accounting for 92.1 percent of such exports by India. Granite and refined petroleum oil exports to China are also on the rise, though China is yet to emerge as a major destination for refined petroleum exports from India. Plastic polymer exports from India are making inroads in the Chinese market along with cotton. Ferro-alloys and refined copper are among India's main metal exports to China. Similarly, exports of electrical transformers and telephony apparatus equipment made in India have also begun to pick up. India's major exports to China are not entirely identical with its main exports to the rest of the world (Table 3) . Gems and petroleum products are two of India's main foreign exchange earners. However, with respect to both commodities, China is a much less significant export market for India compared to other Asian economies (for example, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Saudi Arabia) or the United States. India's other leading exports such as machinery and mechanical appliances, garments, metals and electronics have larger markets in Europe, United States and other parts of Asia as opposed to China. On the other hand, China almost completely dominates India's iron ore and other ore and mineral exports, and is also a key market for India's plastics, marine products, ferro-alloys, spices and processed mineral exports. None of these latter items however, figure among India's overall top 10 exports (Table 3) . Thus, if Indian exports are categorised in terms of their value-based significance, it is possible to conclude that the Chinese market is yet to emerge as an important destination for the most significant exports, although it has emerged so for several of the 'second-most' significant items. These are exports with more than 1.0 percent share in India's total exports to China. A relative analysis of the competitiveness of Indian exports in the Chinese market requires a corresponding analysis of exports originating from competing countries. Southeast Asia is a key region in this regard. Southeast Asia or ASEAN 9 is the second largest source of imports for China in Asia, after Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Mongolia). In sharp contrast to India-China trade, the ASEAN-China merchandise trade balance is in favour of the ASEAN. Within ASEAN, China's leading sources of imports are Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam. China has trade deficits with all these countries (except Vietnam and Singapore). Major ASEAN exports to China are a heterogeneous basket in terms of factor-intensities of commodities, though the basket is broadly dominated by capital-intensive products such as machineries and appliances, followed by resource-intensive items like minerals, plastic and rubber. Electrical machinery and equipment, and machinery and mechanical appliances comprised more than 40 percent of aggregate ASEAN exports to China in 2008.
A comparison between India's main exports to China (Table 2 ) and those by ASEAN (Table  5) Copper and copper articles; f)
Mineral fuels and oils; and g) Electrical machinery and equipment.
The above are common export categories between India and ASEAN at the broad 2-digit level. At a disaggregated level, the similarities are more between exports from India and those from specific ASEAN members rather than between India and the ASEAN as a group. Some individual examples are pertinent in this regard. Ores are major exports to China for both India and Indonesia, though India dominates in iron ore while Indonesia prevails in aluminum ore. Among organic chemicals, xylene and ethylene glycol are key exports for India while terephtalic acid is significant for Indonesia and Thailand. Indonesia exports significant volumes of copper and copper welded wires to China, while India and Philippines export more of copper cathodes.
Analysing Relative Competitiveness
Computing Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) for individual exports is the most popular approach for estimating the export competitiveness of countries. The approach assumes that a country's comparative advantage is 'revealed' in its observed trade patterns. The literature on the subject can be traced back to Liesner, following which there have been several influential contributions by Balassa, Richardson and Chi, and Ferti and Lionel, primarily in explaining bilateral trade patterns of industrial countries through their individual competitiveness.
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Existing empirical studies estimating RCA from China's trade have had diverse research objectives such as analysing factors influencing the overall competitiveness of Chinese exports, as well as explaining such competitiveness from a regional perspective. 12 Relative comparative advantages between China and India in the export of different products as determined by relative factor intensities have been studied through RCAs, as have been the changing structure and comparative advantages of Indian and Chinese exports in line with trade reforms undertaken by the two countries. 13 We measure RCAs by calculating the Balassa Index (described in Annex 1) for individual product (sector) categories at the ITC-HS 2-digit level of commodity classification. These are obtained for the period 2004-06, following which period averages are computed. Due to the lack of comparable data on bilateral trade for the entire period, the comparative analysis is limited to India and four ASEAN countries -Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
14 Data on commodity exports to China by India and the four ASEAN countries is obtained from the COMTRADE database of the United Nations. The COMTRADE reports bilateral export and import flows for all product categories up to the 6-digit level of disaggregated nomenclature for all reporting countries.
As explained in Annex 1, a country enjoys a greater comparative advantage in the export of a particular commodity, if its RCA is greater than 1 for the commodity. In the present instance, we compute the average RCAs for India and the ASEAN-4. While comparing these RCAs, we take note of the fact that if more than one country (between India and the ASEAN-4) has an RCA greater than 1 for a particular commodity, then the one with the highest RCA is considered the most competitive. The results are reported in three groups. First, we cull out common exports at the 2-digit level from India and the ASEAN-4 to China. We compute period average RCAs for these categories. The findings are reported in Table 5 . 18 Second, from Table 5 we identify products where India has RCAs greater than 1. For these products, we compare the corresponding average RCAs for ASEAN-4 (Table 6 ). This helps in identifying products where India's RCAs are not only greater than 1 but also more than those of the ASEAN-4. These therefore are the categories in which India is distinctly more competitive than the ASEAN-4 in the Chinese market. We probe deeper into these categories to study their export patterns at the more disaggregated 6-digit level of commodity classification, for identifying items that India should specifically encourage for exports in line with its competitiveness. The findings are reported in Table 7 . Table 5 shows that India is globally competitive in 21 product categories (that is, RCA>1) out of the 42 common items that both India and the ASEAN-4 are exporting to China. These items are as follow: Table 5 , however, clearly shows that in three of India's current main export groups to Chinamachinery and mechanical appliances, plastic and plastic articles and electrical machinery and equipment -India is not globally competitive since its RCAs in all these three export groups are less than 1. There is little possibility of India obtaining greater access in the Chinese market in these segments as it lacks competitiveness vis-à-vis other exporters of the same products. Table 6 shows that despite being globally competitive in 21 product groups that it is exporting to China, India is not as competitive as the ASEAN-4 in all of these. It is more competitive than the ASEAN-4 in only eight categories. These categories are as follow:
As can be seen further from Table 6 , in some categories, India is more competitive than three of the ASEAN-4, while being at least as competitive as the remaining other country. These are miscellaneous chemical products, articles of leather and special woven fabrics. In the remaining product groups shown in Table 6 , despite being globally competitive, it is relatively less competitive than at least one among the ASEAN-4. In most of these groups, Vietnam and Thailand, rather than Singapore and Malaysia, are more competitive than India.
RCAs computed at the 2-digit level tend to mask some heterogeneity within sectors.
Competitiveness at the 2-digit level, while signifying comparative advantage in production of most items belonging to the group, may not reflect the relative lack of competitiveness in some specific items. It is therefore important to look at the export patterns of constituent items for each broad 2-digit group. In this respect, for the eight 2-digit broad groups where India is more competitive than the ASEAN-4, we try identifying the number of specific items within each group that are currently being exported by India and the ASEAN-4 to China and those that are not (Table 7 ). It is surprising to note that despite India being more competitive than the ASEAN-4 in export of inorganic chemicals, the ASEAN-4 is exporting more than 100 items from the group to China that India is not presently exporting. Similarly, in man-made textile filaments as well as other made-up textile articles, the ASEAN-4 is currently exporting 28 and 19 items exclusively to China. In all these items, India is expected to be as competitive as the ASEAN-4, if not more. The scope for expanding exports also exists in other product lines where China is importing from ASEAN, or the rest of the world, but not from India.
Future Prospects
Reducing the current imbalance in India-China trade would require Indian exports obtaining greater access in the Chinese market. The relative competitiveness of Indian exports is a critical determinant of such access. Empirical evidence establishes India's distinct competitiveness in the Chinese market vis-à-vis major Southeast Asian countries in only select product categories. These are a diverse group of items comprising vegetable products (lac), food preparations (residues from food), chemical and allied products (inorganic, tanning extracts, explosives), hides and skins (raw hides, skins and leather) and textiles (manmade filaments and made-up textile articles). In terms of factor intensities, the products are broadly resource-based and labour-intensive. However, relative competitiveness in these categories should not lead to the overarching conclusion that India is more competitive than Southeast Asia across resource and labour-intensive sectors.
India's current basket of leading exports to China hardly reflects its relative competitiveness.
Other than inorganic chemicals, none of India's competitive product groups (vis-à-vis ASEAN) figure among its major exports to China. The merit in encouraging greater exports from these groups is undisputed. Instead of focusing on less competitive segments such as plastic, machinery and mechanical appliances, and electrical equipment, attention must be devoted to areas where exports have a greater chance of market penetration on competitive grounds.
Indian exports face considerable competition in the Chinese market from Southeast Asian exports. Indeed, the extent of competition is far greater than that captured empirically in this paper since the current analysis was confined only to four Southeast Asian countries. Considerable competition exists beyond these four countries, particularly from other larger ASEAN economies such as Indonesia and Philippines, which, like India, also export ores and metals to China. China's trade deficits with most major ASEAN economies, coupled with the high incidence of machinery and equipment in ASEAN exports to China, indicate China's reliance on ASEAN as an efficient source of intermediate and semi-processed machinery imports. These imports have probably had an instrumental role in enabling several segments of Chinese manufacturing to climb up to relatively higher ends of value chains. To that extent, a large segment of ASEAN exports have facilitated China's manufacturing progress, while India's have not. This explains why Indian exports to China have not been rising as fast as those from Southeast Asia.
The possibility of China and ASEAN carving out a Free Trade Area (FTA) from 2010 strengthens the possibility of ASEAN exports gaining greater access into the Chinese market. This might affect the prospects of Indian exports, particularly in relatively less competitive and low capital-intensive segments such as machinery intermediates. On the other hand, in areas where it is currently more competitive than the ASEAN-4, India needs to work hard to maintain its competitiveness at higher levels. A bilateral trade framework between China and Southeast Asia is expected to make movement easier for almost all product categories on either side. Such ease of movement might reduce relative competitiveness of Indian products as the latter will continue to face existing barriers -both tariff and non-tariff.
From an Indian perspective, there is probably considerable merit in pursuing a bilateral trade agreement with China. Such a framework will not only enhance bilateral trade, but is also likely to do so in a balanced manner. How can this be done? Chinese imports into India are not going to reduce since both Indian producers and consumers benefit from such imports. If bilateral trade has to grow in a balanced fashion, then along with the rise in Chinese imports, India's exports to China must also increase. As of now, India does not have a clear edge over its Southeast Asian competitors in the Chinese market in most products where it is otherwise globally competitive. Even if it emphasises on the few segments where it is relatively competitive, it may lose its edge over time given the possibility of the China-ASEAN FTA materialising in the near future. An India-China trade pact can nullify the threat to Indian exports arising from facilitating arrangements that benefit India's competitor exports.
